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Perception, Emotions, and Delusions
The Case of the Capgras Delusion: 
Delusion, Self-Deception, 




T he study of delusions has important implications for understanding the role played by affective processes on the road from experience to belief. it can also shed light on the forms of modularity these processes manifest. there 
are at least two different ways in which emotional processes may be relevant to 
the etiology of delusional beliefs. First, current models of delusion converge in 
proposing that such beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. 
these unusual experiences are thought to include affective or emotional experi-
ences. For example, it is argued that the capgras delusion (the belief that a known 
person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective 
experience in response to seeing a known person (Ellis & Young, 1990). similarly, 
the cotard delusion (which involves the belief that one is dead or unreal in some 
way) may stem from a general flattening of affective responses to external stimuli 
(Ellis & Young, 1990), and the seed of the Frégoli delusion (the belief that one is 
being followed by known people who are in disguise) may lie in heightened affec-
tive responses to unfamiliar faces (Davies, coltheart, langdon, & breen, 2001). in 
delusions of persecution, the experiential component could be an oversensitivity 
to other people’s disingenuous expressions of emotions (Davis & Gibson, 2000; 
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larusso, 1978). Experience-based proposals have been provided for a number of 
other delusions (Davies et al., 2001; langdon & coltheart, 2000; Maher, 1988; 
stone & Young, 1997).
there is also a second way in which emotional processes may be relevant to 
the etiology of delusional beliefs, for one must also explain why these abnormal 
experiences give rise to delusional beliefs and why these delusional beliefs are 
“firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what con-
stitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary” (american 
Psychiatric association, 2000, p. 821). although current models of delusion con-
verge in proposing that delusions are based on unusual experiences, they differ 
in the role that they accord experience in the formation of delusions. in some 
accounts, the experience comprises the very content of the delusion, whereas in 
other accounts the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experi-
ence. i call these the endorsement and explanationist models, respectively (see 
bayne & Pacherie, 2004a, 2004b). Emotional factors may also contribute to such 
an explanation.
in the present chapter, i will focus on the capgras delusion. three reasons 
motivate this choice. First, central to this delusion is an emotion or rather a pair 
of emotions not so often discussed in philosophical circles: namely, the feelings of 
familiarity and unfamiliarity.1 second, there now exist in the literature several pro-
posals as to how the feeling of familiarity one normally experiences when encoun-
tering known people is generated and what would cause the anomalous experience 
in capgras patients. these proposals strongly suggest that the system underlying 
the feelings of familiarity and unfamiliarity is modular. third, at least one of these 
proposals also suggests a way of fleshing out an endorsement account of the capgras 
delusion that exhibits an important explanatory link between the modularity of the 
underlying emotional system and the persistence of the delusional belief.
i will start by saying a little more on the distinction between endorsement and 
explanationist models of delusions. i will then discuss some recent models of visual 
face processing and the way they account for the generation of affective responses 
to familiar faces. i will argue that despite disagreeing on how, exactly, emotional 
responses to faces are generated, they all support the view that the system that 
generates them is modular. i will also argue that at least one of these accounts pro-
vides strong support for an endorsement account of the capgras delusion. Finally, 
i will discuss the role affective factors may play in explaining why the delusional 
belief once formed is maintained and will argue that there is an important link 
between the modularity of this emotional system and the persistence of the delu-
sional belief.
two experIentIal routes to delusIon
let us consider the distinction between endorsement and explanationist models 
in more detail.2 according to endorsement models, the experience comprises the 
very content of the delusion, such that the delusional patient simply believes—that 
is, doxastically endorses—the content of his or her experiential state or at least 
something very much like the content of this experiential state. in explanationist 
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accounts the delusion is adopted in an attempt to explain an unusual experience.3 
Experience-based accounts of delusions involve (at least) two components: (a) an 
explanation of the delusional patient’s experiential state, and (b) an explanation of 
the delusional patient’s doxastic state. Endorsement and explanationist models face 
distinct challenges in providing these explanations. Explanationist models appear 
to have an easier job of (a) than endorsement models: the less one packs into the 
content of the perceptual experience, the easier it is to explain how the experiential 
state acquires its content. Very primitive explanationist models, according to which 
the delusion in question is generated by nothing more than an absence of certain 
kinds of affect, would seem to have rather little work to do here.
but what explanationist models gain with respect to (a) they lose with respect 
to (b). the explanationist holds that delusional beliefs are adopted in an attempt to 
explain unusual experiences. the problem with this suggestion is that delusional 
beliefs are typically very poor explanations of the events that they are supposedly 
intended to explain. More plausible explanations of their strange experiences are 
available to the patients, some of which might be actively recommended to them by 
family and medical staff. Furthermore, delusional patients do not appear to hold 
their delusions in the tentative and provisional manner with which explanations 
are usually held. Explanationists are well positioned to account for the content of 
the patient’s experiential state, but they face problems in explaining why patients 
refuse to acknowledge the implausibility of the delusional beliefs they adopt in 
response to those experiences.
by contrast, endorsement models would seem to have a more plausible story 
to tell about how delusional patients move from experiences to belief. Perhaps, as 
Davies et al. (2001) suggest, delusional individuals have difficulties inhibiting the 
prepotent doxastic response to their experiences. seeing is certainly not believing, 
but the transition from perceiving “that P” to believing “that P” is a familiar and 
attractive one. Of course, things are not completely plain sailing for the endorse-
ment theorist. For one thing, we would need to know why delusional patients fail 
to take account of their background beliefs; why do they fail to inhibit the pre-
potent doxastic response in the way that a “healthy” person presumably would, 
if faced with the same bizarre and implausible sensory experience?4 but on the 
face of things the endorsement account looks to have a more plausible account of 
why, given the experiences that the account ascribes to the patients, they go on to 
form the beliefs that they do. Where the endorsement account would appear to be 
weakest is in explaining how delusional patients could have the experiences that 
the account says they do. i return to this point later.
how does the distinction between endorsement and explanationist models map 
on to the better known distinction between one-deficit and two-deficit accounts of 
delusions? One-deficit accounts, such as Maher’s (1974), hold that the only impair-
ments delusional patients have are perceptual and/or affective: their mechanisms 
of belief fixation operate within the normal range (although they might be biased 
in some way). two-deficit accounts, by contrast, hold that delusional patients 
have belief-fixation processes that are outside the normal range. the distinction 
between one- and two-deficit accounts is orthogonal to the distinction between 
explanationist and endorsement accounts (Davies et al., 2001).
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both endorsement and explanationist models can be developed in either 
one-deficit or two-deficit terms. consider first the endorsement account. as the 
Muller–lyer illusion demonstrates, normal individuals do not always believe “that 
P” when confronted with the perception “that P.” although the explanationist 
model of delusions might be thought to suggest a two-deficit view, it can be devel-
oped in one-deficit terms. Whether or not the explanationist will need to invoke a 
belief-formation abnormality depends on whether a normal individual would form 
(and maintain) the sorts of explanations of his or her unusual experiences that 
delusional patients do (bayne & Pacherie, 2004a, 2004b).
returning now to the capgras delusion, we can see that an endorsement 
account of this delusion would hold, for example, that the patient sees the woman 
he is looking at (who is his wife) as an imposter (that is, as someone who merely 
looks like his wife). the difficulty for such an account would be to explain how 
experience can represent the person in front of the patient not only as unfamiliar 
but also as an impostor of his spouse. in contrast, according to the explanationist, 
the patient does not perceive his wife as an impostor; rather, he simply fails to 
have the expected experience of familiarity when looking at his wife. he forms 
the belief that the woman he is looking at is not his wife in an attempt to explain 
his lack of affect. the main difficulty the explanationist confronts lies in explain-
ing why the person forms such an implausible explanation of this unusual experi-
ence. in addition, both accounts face the problem of explaining why the delusional 
belief is maintained. General knowledge tells us that impostor stories are unlikely 
in most instances. Why would someone want to impersonate one’s relatives? the 
testimony of others, whether family members, friends or doctors, goes against the 
impostor theory. Why do capgras patients not listen to them?
before turning to this latter question, let us discuss recent cognitive models of 
the experiential factor in the capgras delusion and see whether they support an 
explanationist or endorsement account of the delusion.
the experIentIal factor In 
the capgras delusIon
the best-known model of the capgras delusion is the two-route model of face 
recognition first proposed by bauer to account for propopagnosia and adopted by 
Ellis and Young (1990). it is a robust finding (Ellis, Quayle, & Young, 1999; tranel, 
Fowles, & Damasio, 1985) that, when shown both familiar and unfamiliar faces, 
normal subjects produce larger autonomic arousal to familiar faces than to unfa-
miliar faces, as measured by skin conductance responses (scrs). this autonomic 
response has been interpreted as a form of covert recognition. bauer (1984, 1986) 
discovered that prosopagnosic patients, despite being unable to recognize previ-
ously known faces consciously, still produced a larger scr to them than to previ-
ously unfamiliar faces.
to account for this finding, he proposed a two-route model of face recognition. 
On this model, face recognition involves two information-processing pathways: (1) 
a ventral visuo-semantic pathway that constructs a visual image encoding semantic 
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information about facial features and is responsible for overt recognition, and (2) a 
dorsal visuo-affective pathway responsible for covert autonomic recognition and for 
the specific affective response to familiar faces (the feeling of familiarity). in pros-
opagnosia, the visuo-semantic pathway would be damaged, which would account 
for the patient’s inability to recognize faces, and the visuo-affective pathway would 
remain intact, which would explain why they retain a covert autonomic recog-
nition of familiar faces. Ellis and Young proposed that capgras syndrome might 
be a mirror image of prosopagnosia, with the affective pathway damaged but the 
visuo-semantic pathway intact.5 they predicted that capgras patients would fail 
to produce the normal, higher scr to familiar compared with unfamiliar faces. 
this prediction was borne out in two studies by independent groups (Ellis, Young, 
Quayle, & de Pauw, 1997; hirstein & ramachandran, 1997).
When looking at familiar faces, capgras patients would have highly unusual 
experiences. For instance, when looking at one’s spouse’s face, the spouse would be 
recognized as looking like one’s spouse, but the normal feeling of familiarity would 
be absent (and, indeed, a feeling of unfamiliarity would be present). the fact that 
the capgras delusion is usually restricted to close relatives can be explained if we 
assume, quite plausibly, that the affective response to close relatives is normally 
higher than to familiar but emotionally neutral persons such as one’s grocer or 
mailman. the perceptual–affective dissonance resulting from the absence of the 
expected emotional response would thus be much greater for close relatives.
this original two-route model was proposed as both a neuroanatomical model 
and a cognitive model. but these two aspects of the model can be evaluated sepa-
rately. indeed, the plausibility of bauer’s neuro-anatomical conception has been 
questioned (breen, caine, & coltheart, 2000; hirstein & ramachandran, 1997; 
tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1995), but the idea of a dissociation between overt 
recognition and covert affective discrimination has generally been retained.
What remains unclear in this original two-route model, however, is at what 
stage the two cognitive pathways bifurcate. bruce and Young (1986) developed a 
single route model of face processing involving a series of sequential stages. in the 
first stage of their model (what they call “structural encoding”), the seen face is 
encoded using “descriptions” that are viewer centered. these structural descrip-
tions can then be analyzed independently for expression; facial speech; informa-
tion about sex, age, and race; and identification. in the second stage of their model, 
the seen face, if it is familiar, will contact with its stored representation in the face 
recognition units (FrUs). Familiar faces will then activate information held at the 
third stage of the model, the person identity node (PiN), which contains semantic 
and biographical information about the person and can be accessed by ways other 
than face recognition. at the fourth and final stage, the person’s name, which is 
stored independently of his or her biographical details, will be retrieved.
in a two-route model of face recognition, the pathway described in bruce 
and Young’s model would correspond to the explicit recognition route. the ques-
tion then is at what stage the autonomic recognition pathway bifurcates from this 
explicit recognition pathway. the original neuro-anatomical interpretation of the 
dual-route model seemed to require a very early bifurcation, given the early ana-
tomical separation of the dorsal and ventral pathways. however, as breen et al. 
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(2000) point out in their critical discussion of this model, it is implicit in the argu-
ments of bauer and of Ellis and Young that the affective response must be attached 
to a particular face and hence that the face must have been at least implicitly rec-
ognized. a very early bifurcation would then require a reduplication of the face-
recognition stage. breen et al. (2000) see this reduplication as unparsimonious and 
the anatomical arguments for it as problematic. instead, they propose a modified 
dual-route model. they argue that there is only a single face-recognition stage, but 
they posit two pathways subsequent to recognition: one leading to the processing 
of semantic and biographical information about the person and the other to the 
system responsible for generating affective responses to familiar faces.
in a recent paper, Ellis and lewis (2001) endorse breen and colleagues’ modi-
fied dual-route model, but they introduce an important modification. in the breen et 
al. model, the person identity nodes and the affective response module are directly 
connected. Ellis and lewis argue against such a direct connection; they point out 
that if this connection existed, damage to the pathway from the face-recognition 
units to the person identity nodes or the pathway from the face-recognition units to 
the affective response module could be circumvented. in this case, the double dis-
sociation between explicit recognition and implicit autonomic discrimination seen 
between prosopagnosics and capgras patients would not be explained.
instead, Ellis and lewis argue that the two modules are not directly connected, 
but that their outputs each feed into an integrative device where they are recom-
bined to yield a single percept. this would provide the necessary data for the per-
son to be identified by comparing the joint information representing recognition 
and the affective response against a stored and therefore expected representation. 
in capgras patients, where the affective response module is impaired, this device 
would detect a mismatch between the expected and the actual affective response, 
yielding a misidentification of, say, the spouse as someone else—someone look-
ing like her and yet unfamiliar. another possible motivation for positing such an 
integrative device would be to account for the transition from the unconscious 
autonomic response to the conscious feeling of familiarity. One may think that to 
be conscious of an affective response, one must bind it to a specific object. the fact 
that patients with prosopagnosia typically show a normal heightened scr to previ-
ously known faces but fail to experience a conscious feeling of familiarity may be 
taken as evidence for this idea.
although this modified dual-route model of face perception provides an account 
of the experiential anomaly in the capgras delusion, it is unclear whether it supports 
an endorsement over an explanationist account of the delusion. this would seem 
to depend on how exactly the integrative device compares incoming with stored 
information and how it interprets discrepancies. this would seem also to depend 
on whether this comparison is integral to the face-processing system or is carried 
out in a separate center possibly subject to top-down influences. but, as Ellis and 
lewis acknowledge, these are issues on which work still needs to be done.
there is, however, a very recent proposal by hirstein (2005) that would seem 
to tip the balance more clearly in favor of an endorsement account. hirstein’s is 
also a dual-route account, but it builds on a different model of face perception 
developed by haxby and colleagues (haxby, hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000; hoffman 
& haxby, 2000). this model is both a neuro-anatomical and a cognitive model of 
face processing. Working primarily from functional brain imaging studies, haxby 
et al. found that the temporal lobe contains two face-processing streams: a medial 
temporal pathway involving the fusiform gyrus and a lateral temporal pathway 
involving the superior temporal sulcus. they hypothesized different functional 
specializations for the two pathways and suggested that the medial pathway spe-
cializes in representing the invariant aspects of faces that underlie identity, and the 
lateral pathway produces representations of the changeable aspects of faces.
their model distinguishes a core face-processing system and an extended sys-
tem. the core system comprises the inferior occipital gyri, the lateral fusiform gyrus, 
and the superior temporal sulcus. the inferior occipital gyri would be involved in 
the early visual analysis of facial features and would provide input to both the lat-
eral fusiform gyrus, specializing in the representation of the invariant aspects of 
faces, and the superior temporal sulcus, specializing in the representation of chang-
ing aspects of faces. these representations would then be used by the extended 
systems in a variety of tasks. representations of invariant aspects of faces would 
underlie explicit recognition of unique identity; representations of variable aspects 
of faces would provide input to various systems specialized in the processing of eye 
gaze direction, speech-related movements, or the facial expression of emotions.
O’toole, roark, and abdi (2002) propose an interesting modification of haxby’s 
model to accommodate psychological evidence that information for identifying a 
human face can be found both in the invariant structure of features and in idiosyn-
cratic movements and gestures. More precisely, psychological evidence indicates 
that dynamic information contributes more to recognition under nonoptimal view-
ing conditions—such as poor illumination or low image resolution—than invariant 
information does, even when the latter is available. Moreover, the contribution of 
dynamic information increases as a viewer’s experience with a face increases. in 
particular, familiarity with a face allows one to extract its dynamic signature (i.e., 
the characteristic or idiosyncratic movements a particular face makes, such as the 
distinctive smile or the way of expressing surprise a person may have). Of course, 
the better one knows a person, the more reliable this dynamic signature becomes 
for identification. O’toole et al. therefore propose that the sts could be involved 
in the identification of dynamic facial signatures and that this information could 
be used, together with representations of invariant features, in the identification 
of familiar faces.
in hirstein’s interpretation, haxby’s model provides the basis for a mind-
reading theory of the capgras delusion and of delusions of misidentification 
more generally. according to his proposal, the medial temporal pathway pro-
duces “external representations” (i.e., representations of the outward appear-
ance of a person’s face). in contrast, the lateral temporal pathway would yield 
information relevant to “internal representations” of a person—representations 
of what his or her mind is like. Perception of changeable aspects of faces pro-
vides information about another person’s current state of mind. in particular, 
eye gaze can inform us about what a person is attending to and what her current 
interests and intentions are, and facial expression can inform us about the per-
son’s current emotional state. hirstein further suggests that haxby’s two routes 
RU94703_C006.indd   110 7/19/08   11:44:11 AM
perceptIon, emotIons, and delusIons 111
& haxby, 2000). this model is both a neuro-anatomical and a cognitive model of 
face processing. Working primarily from functional brain imaging studies, haxby 
et al. found that the temporal lobe contains two face-processing streams: a medial 
temporal pathway involving the fusiform gyrus and a lateral temporal pathway 
involving the superior temporal sulcus. they hypothesized different functional 
specializations for the two pathways and suggested that the medial pathway spe-
cializes in representing the invariant aspects of faces that underlie identity, and the 
lateral pathway produces representations of the changeable aspects of faces.
their model distinguishes a core face-processing system and an extended sys-
tem. the core system comprises the inferior occipital gyri, the lateral fusiform gyrus, 
and the superior temporal sulcus. the inferior occipital gyri would be involved in 
the early visual analysis of facial features and would provide input to both the lat-
eral fusiform gyrus, specializing in the representation of the invariant aspects of 
faces, and the superior temporal sulcus, specializing in the representation of chang-
ing aspects of faces. these representations would then be used by the extended 
systems in a variety of tasks. representations of invariant aspects of faces would 
underlie explicit recognition of unique identity; representations of variable aspects 
of faces would provide input to various systems specialized in the processing of eye 
gaze direction, speech-related movements, or the facial expression of emotions.
O’toole, roark, and abdi (2002) propose an interesting modification of haxby’s 
model to accommodate psychological evidence that information for identifying a 
human face can be found both in the invariant structure of features and in idiosyn-
cratic movements and gestures. More precisely, psychological evidence indicates 
that dynamic information contributes more to recognition under nonoptimal view-
ing conditions—such as poor illumination or low image resolution—than invariant 
information does, even when the latter is available. Moreover, the contribution of 
dynamic information increases as a viewer’s experience with a face increases. in 
particular, familiarity with a face allows one to extract its dynamic signature (i.e., 
the characteristic or idiosyncratic movements a particular face makes, such as the 
distinctive smile or the way of expressing surprise a person may have). Of course, 
the better one knows a person, the more reliable this dynamic signature becomes 
for identification. O’toole et al. therefore propose that the sts could be involved 
in the identification of dynamic facial signatures and that this information could 
be used, together with representations of invariant features, in the identification 
of familiar faces.
in hirstein’s interpretation, haxby’s model provides the basis for a mind-
reading theory of the capgras delusion and of delusions of misidentification 
more generally. according to his proposal, the medial temporal pathway pro-
duces “external representations” (i.e., representations of the outward appear-
ance of a person’s face). in contrast, the lateral temporal pathway would yield 
information relevant to “internal representations” of a person—representations 
of what his or her mind is like. Perception of changeable aspects of faces pro-
vides information about another person’s current state of mind. in particular, 
eye gaze can inform us about what a person is attending to and what her current 
interests and intentions are, and facial expression can inform us about the per-
son’s current emotional state. hirstein further suggests that haxby’s two routes 
AU: pls spell out 
acronym for 1st use
RU94703_C006.indd   111 7/19/08   11:44:11 AM
delusIon and self-deceptIon112
could correspond to the processes that are doubly dissociated in prosopagnosia 
and capgras syndrome. thus, in proposopagnosia, the medial temporal pathway 
would be damaged, and the patient would not be able to produce a representa-
tion of the outward appearance of the seen face. conversely, in the capgras 
delusion, the lateral temporal pathway would be dysfunctional and would either 
fail to produce an internal representation or produce one that is not the same one 
that the patient has always used.
consistent with the hypothesis that, in capgras syndrome, the normal func-
tioning of the sts would be impaired is the fact that the patient Ds examined by 
hirstein and ramachandran (1997) was defective in processing gaze and unable 
to tell whether or not a face in a photograph was looking toward him. in contrast, 
Ds was not impaired in the recognition of facial expressions of emotions. however, 
hirstein and ramachandran tested him only with digitized images of models pos-
ing basic emotions such as fear, anger, or happiness. One is left to wonder whether 
Ds would have performed as accurately if shown dynamic displays of emotional 
expressions or less prototypical facial expressions of emotions.
another study by breen, caine, and coltheart (2002) investigating patient 
MF with a delusion of misidentification resembling capgras delusion showed 
that MF was unable to identify the facial expressions of anger, disgust, and fear.6 
interestingly, MF was also unable to match faces across expressions. in other 
words, if shown two pictures of the same or two different people, each having a 
different expression, he was almost at chance at telling whether or not they were 
pictures of the same person. to explain this result, one may speculate that when 
the system specialized in representing the variable aspects of faces is damaged, the 
other system specialized in the representation of invariant aspects would tend to 
overshoot and to treat changeable aspects as invariant.
Further evidence in favor of hirstein’s view comes from the fact that some 
comments of patients with capgras syndrome refer straightforwardly to psycho-
logical differences between the original and impostor. thus, one patient “became 
convinced that her husband’s personality had changed” (Frazer & roberts, 1994). 
another claimed that there were two doctors looking after him: the first consul-
tant (whom he called John smith) was “a nice bloke,” whereas the second (a Dr. J. 
smith) was someone who was “distant and aloof’” (Young, 1998, p. 39).
Often, the supposed change of personality is for the worse. adolphs (1999) 
suggests that when confronted with ambiguous expressions of emotions or com-
plex blends of emotions in another person’s face, people would judge the person’s 
emotional state from his or her facial expression by reconstructing in their own 
brains a simulation of what the other person might be feeling; in other words, they 
ask themselves how they would feel if they were making the same facial expres-
sion. capgras patients often exhibit paranoid tendencies and a suspicious cast of 
mind. One may speculate that when they are confronted with facial expressions 
that are, for them, “ambiguous” because of their impairment in the emotional 
processing of faces, capgras patients would use their own emotional system in 
simulation to understand others and would project their own negative states of 
mind on those surrounding them. this might explain why, in contrast to patients 
with amygdala damage, who show a positive bias in judging faces (adolphs, 1999), 
capgras patients tend to give negative ratings to faces. this might also explain why 
they tend to see people around them as ill-intentioned. thus, one patient described 
by butler (2000) accused the nursing staff of having murdered members of his 
family. When he interacted with his father, this patient “minutely examined [his 
father’s] face before accusing him of being a criminal double who had taken his 
father’s place” (butler, 2000, p. 685).
it is as yet unclear what evidential support hirstein’s interpretation of haxby’s 
model has because many of the predictions it yields remain untested. For instance, 
there are no systematic data as yet regarding possible impairments of patients with 
capgras syndrome in the processing of emotional expressions in faces. it is also 
somewhat unclear how, exactly, this model would account for the presence of nor-
mal scrs to faces in patients with prosopagnosia and their absence in patients 
with capgras syndrome. relying on evidence that both the medial and the lat-
eral temporal pathways connect with the amygdala (carmichael & Price, 1995), 
hirstein suggests that both routes may be able to produce scrs; the fusiform 
gyrus would be involved in producing an scr to the sight of a familiar face and the 
superior temporal sulcus an scr to emotional facial expressions. but the presence 
of normal scrs in prosopagnosic patients and their absence in capgras patients 
suggest that the lateral temporal pathway contributes more to the production of 
specific scrs to familiar faces.7 building on O’toole and colleagues’ idea that the 
lateral temporal pathway is involved in the identification of dynamic facial signa-
tures, one may speculate that the production of scrs depends at least in part on 
the identification of these signatures.
this is important because of an objection to hirstein’s interpretation of haxby’s 
model that may naturally come to mind.8 One may agree that an impairment of 
the lateral temporal pathway would lead one to misconstrue facial expressions of 
emotions. but why should mistaking one’s father’s expression of concern for an 
expression of anger lead one to form the belief that this person is not one’s father 
but an impostor rather than the less farfetched belief that one’s father is angry or 
in a bad mood, perhaps for some reason one cannot fathom?
there are two complementary lines of answer to this objection. the first is that, 
although indeed a single or a few experiences of discrepancy between one’s usual 
representation of the personality of someone and one’s immediate experience of 
his or her present state of mind might not lead one to form the capgras delusion, 
systematic discrepancies experienced over a period of time may well lead one to 
such a belief. the second line of answer is that impairment to the lateral temporal 
pathway would disrupt not only the correct reading of expressions of emotions but 
also the identification of the dynamic signature of the face of the person. someone 
with such an impairment would not only mistake his father’s expression of concern 
for one of anger, but would also see this expression of anger as different in its 
dynamics from his father’s ordinary way of facially expressing anger. More gener-
ally, the way this person animates his face would appear discrepant with the way 
his father animates his face when experiencing various emotions.
thus, one may tentatively conclude that hirstein’s story about the experien-
tial basis of the capgras delusion, if true, would enhance the plausibility of the 
endorsement account. as hirstein points out, according to this view:
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capgras patients tend to give negative ratings to faces. this might also explain why 
they tend to see people around them as ill-intentioned. thus, one patient described 
by butler (2000) accused the nursing staff of having murdered members of his 
family. When he interacted with his father, this patient “minutely examined [his 
father’s] face before accusing him of being a criminal double who had taken his 
father’s place” (butler, 2000, p. 685).
it is as yet unclear what evidential support hirstein’s interpretation of haxby’s 
model has because many of the predictions it yields remain untested. For instance, 
there are no systematic data as yet regarding possible impairments of patients with 
capgras syndrome in the processing of emotional expressions in faces. it is also 
somewhat unclear how, exactly, this model would account for the presence of nor-
mal scrs to faces in patients with prosopagnosia and their absence in patients 
with capgras syndrome. relying on evidence that both the medial and the lat-
eral temporal pathways connect with the amygdala (carmichael & Price, 1995), 
hirstein suggests that both routes may be able to produce scrs; the fusiform 
gyrus would be involved in producing an scr to the sight of a familiar face and the 
superior temporal sulcus an scr to emotional facial expressions. but the presence 
of normal scrs in prosopagnosic patients and their absence in capgras patients 
suggest that the lateral temporal pathway contributes more to the production of 
specific scrs to familiar faces.7 building on O’toole and colleagues’ idea that the 
lateral temporal pathway is involved in the identification of dynamic facial signa-
tures, one may speculate that the production of scrs depends at least in part on 
the identification of these signatures.
this is important because of an objection to hirstein’s interpretation of haxby’s 
model that may naturally come to mind.8 One may agree that an impairment of 
the lateral temporal pathway would lead one to misconstrue facial expressions of 
emotions. but why should mistaking one’s father’s expression of concern for an 
expression of anger lead one to form the belief that this person is not one’s father 
but an impostor rather than the less farfetched belief that one’s father is angry or 
in a bad mood, perhaps for some reason one cannot fathom?
there are two complementary lines of answer to this objection. the first is that, 
although indeed a single or a few experiences of discrepancy between one’s usual 
representation of the personality of someone and one’s immediate experience of 
his or her present state of mind might not lead one to form the capgras delusion, 
systematic discrepancies experienced over a period of time may well lead one to 
such a belief. the second line of answer is that impairment to the lateral temporal 
pathway would disrupt not only the correct reading of expressions of emotions but 
also the identification of the dynamic signature of the face of the person. someone 
with such an impairment would not only mistake his father’s expression of concern 
for one of anger, but would also see this expression of anger as different in its 
dynamics from his father’s ordinary way of facially expressing anger. More gener-
ally, the way this person animates his face would appear discrepant with the way 
his father animates his face when experiencing various emotions.
thus, one may tentatively conclude that hirstein’s story about the experien-
tial basis of the capgras delusion, if true, would enhance the plausibility of the 
endorsement account. as hirstein points out, according to this view:
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the capgras patient is looking at someone who visually resembles his father, 
but who appears to have a different mind, a different personality, with differ-
ent dispositions to do different things. this is exactly what an impostor is, and 
this is exactly the experience one would have looking at an impostor. (2005, 
p. 133)
if the content of the patient’s experience is as hirstein describes it—an experi-
ence of the visually presented person as unfamiliar—and not just an experience 
as of a person that looks like one’s father but lacks the feeling of familiarity that 
normally accompanies this visual experience, then the impostor belief, far from 
being a fantastic explanation of the abnormal experience, would be a direct read-
ing of it.
the modularIty of famIlIarIty
if we take as our guide the set of criteria proposed by Fodor (1983) for modularity, 
it seems pretty obvious that the processes through which feelings of facial famil-
iarity are generated qualify as modular. to convince the skeptical reader, let us 
examine each of these criteria in turn:
Dedicated neural architecture. although it is still debated what the exact 
neuro-anatomical pathways involved in the two routes to face recognition 
are, all the models described in the previous section agree that there are 
dedicated neural pathways for explicit recognition and for affective pro-
cessing of faces.
Specific breakdowns. the capgras delusion is a clear example of a specific 
breakdown and its double dissociation with prosopagnosia is a further sign 
of its specificity. One may add that although the capgras delusion often 
occurs in a psychiatric setting—most typically in subjects diagnosed as 
suffering from paranoid schizophrenia—over one third of the documented 
cases of capgras syndrome have occurred in conjunction with traumatic 
brain damage, with lesions predominantly in the temporal cortex, which 
suggests that the syndrome has an organic basis (signer, 1994).
Mandatory operation. When seeing a known face, the feeling of familiar-
ity is automatically generated. indeed, if it were not, there would be no 
reason why it would be disturbing to see the face of a well-known person 
without at the same time experiencing a feeling of familiarity.
Fast operation. the feeling of familiarity is experienced quickly. it is typi-
cally simultaneous with the conscious recognition of the face.
Shallow output. this is somewhat more controversial. On two-route models 
such as Ellis and Young’s or breen and colleagues’, the immediate output 
of the affective processing of faces is indeed shallow and takes the form 
of a “glow” of arousal. in hirstein’s view, the output would be something 
more complex—namely, an “internal representation” of the way a face is 
animated and of what this reveals about the personality of the person one 
sees together with a sense of familiarity (or lack thereof).9
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Inaccessibility. We have no conscious access to the stages through which the 
feeling of familiarity is generated. indeed, capgras patients who admit 
that the person in front of them looks, say, just like their son but deny that 
he is are typically at a loss to explain what makes them think this person is 
not their son. if pushed, they might point to some minor detail such as the 
way the “impostor” ties his shoelaces, the size of his eyes, or the texture 
of his skin. For instance, one patient remarked, “there’s someone like my 
son’s double which isn’t my son. i can tell my son because my son’s differ-
ent but you have to be quick to notice it” (Young et al., 1993, p. 696; see 
also Merrin & silberfarb, 1976).
Informational encapsulation. in the same way that measuring the two arrows 
in the Müller–lyer illusion will not make you see them as of equal length, 
being told by someone you trust that the person in front of you is someone 
you know (or do not know) will not restore a feeling of familiarity or sense 
of their personality if you do not experience it in the first place (or will 
not suppress it if you experience it). indeed, capgras patients seem quite 
impervious to all the evidence they may be given that the person they 
take to be an impostor of, say, their father is actually their father. Patient 
Ds, studied by hirstein and ramachandran (1997), provides an intrigu-
ing illustration of this point. to try to rid him of his delusional belief, his 
father thought of the following trick. One day he walked into his son’s 
room and announced that he had sent away the impostor to china and 
was his real father. Ds’s delusion seemed to abate slightly as the result 
of this unorthodox procedure, but, as his father himself acknowledged, 
although Ds seemed to have accepted him as his father intellectually, he 
had not done so emotionally.
Domain specificity. here things get a bit tricky. Of course, things other than 
faces can produce feelings of familiarity. animals, especially pets, and 
various kinds of inanimate objects (one’s worn-out philosophical arm-
chair, one’s favorite sweater), can also give rise to feelings of familiarity. 
Even if we restrict ourselves to people, not only the sight of their faces but 
also the sound of their voices can produce feelings of familiarity. indeed, 
although the most common form of the capgras delusion is for people, 
there are also documented cases of for animals and inanimate objects 
that may or may not coexist with the capgras delusion for persons (see 
berson, 1983, and Edelstyn & Oyebode, 1999, for reviews). similarly, 
although the capgras delusion is usually visual, in at least three docu-
mented cases, blind patients suffered from capgras-type delusions (reid, 
Young, & hellawell, 1993; rojo, caballero, iruela, & baca, 1991; signer, 
Van Ness, & Davis, 1990), suggesting that there could be an auditory form 
of the delusion.
in light of this, it would be improper to say that the affective system that gen-
erates the sense of familiarity is domain specific in the sense that it only takes as 
input visual stimuli from faces. if we temporarily restrict ourselves to the capgras 
delusion in the visual modality, one thing to point out is that it is perhaps unduly 
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restrictive to call the dual-route models discussed in the previous section models 
of face recognition. a recent brain-imaging study shows that in humans both the 
fusiform gyrus and the superior temporal sulcus respond similarly to faces and 
animals (chao, Martin, & haxby, 1999). another study (Gauthier, tarr, anderson, 
skudlarski, & Gore, 1999) also indicates that the brain areas thought to be critical 
for face perception are also specifically activated by objects that are not faces for 
expert subjects (i.e., subjects, such as bird watchers or car experts, who can cat-
egorize such objects at the individual level rather then at the more general family 
level). thus, an alternative characterization of the so-called face-recognition sys-
tem would be as a system specialized in the recognition of objects at very specific 
levels—typically, the level of individuals.
Faces are recognized most often at this very specific level (Jules vs. Jim), 
whereas objects and animals are typically recognized in a less specific manner 
(as a cat vs. a dog or a chair vs. a table). Pets and personal belongings may, how-
ever, be exceptions. a cat owner will recognize his cat not just as a cat but as this 
very specific cat. a carpenter will recognize his tools not just as tools or as ham-
mers and saws and screwdrivers but as this particular hammer, saw, or screwdriver. 
interestingly, subjects with the capgras delusion for animals or objects typically 
have the delusion for objects that are significant for them and that they can recog-
nize at the individual level—for instance a favorite cow in the case of a farmer or, 
for another subject, his tools. the same remarks apply to the auditory form of the 
capgras delusion. Known cases are only for voices that can be recognized at the 
individual level, not for other types of auditory objects that we typically categorize 
at a less fine-grained level. thus, although this may go beyond the sense in which 
Fodor intended the notion of domain specificity, the affective system that gener-
ates the sense of familiarity may still be considered domain specific insofar as it 
takes specific types of descriptors as its inputs, such as face recognition units, voice 
recognition units, and other very fine-grained recognition units yielded by earlier 
perceptual analysis processes.
Why insist that familiarity be modular? in the previous section, i presented 
models of face processing that suggest that there is more to the feeling of familiar-
ity (or unfamiliarity) than simply a glow of arousal (or lack thereof). in particular, 
according to hirstein’s view, the feeling of familiarity comes attached to an object 
that is less the face understood simply as an external representation than it is the 
face understood as a window into the personality of someone—what hirstein calls 
an “internal representation.” in other words, the feeling of familiarity does not so 
much attach to a face simply conceived as a particular configuration of physical 
features than to the person behind the face. i suggested that this way of conceiving 
of the experiential basis of the capgras delusion, if correct, would enhance the 
plausibility of the endorsement account.
but a further condition on the plausibility of this endorsement account is that 
the processes through which the feeling of familiarity—understood in the sub-
stantive sense just delineated—is generated to be to some extent modular. if, as 
Fodor insists, modularity is what demarcates perception from cognition or, as i 
would say, experience from belief, an endorsement account needs to secure the 
modularity of familiarity. Otherwise, an explanationist could well argue that the 
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so-called feelings of familiarity or unfamiliarity, when they are taken to involve 
more than a glow of arousal or lack thereof, are not actually experiences but rather 
interpretations or explanations of more primitive experiences. to put it differently, 
the modularity of feelings of familiarity or unfamiliarity is consistent with the 
explanationist position as long as these feelings are thought to involve no more 
than a glow or arousal or lack thereof. but when more is built into these feel-
ings, their modularity does not sit so well with explanationist accounts. the raison 
d’être of explanationist accounts is to fill the gap between the contents of the 
experience and the contents of the delusional belief. if there is no gap to be filled, 
they become superfluous.
as we will see in the next section, there is still another reason one may want to 
secure the modularity of feelings of familiarity, for this modularity may contribute to 
explaining why delusional beliefs are not just formed but also firmly maintained.
from delusIonal experIence 
to delusIonal BelIef
Even if we accept an endorsement account of the capgras delusion and think the 
delusional belief inherits its content from the delusional experience, we still have 
to explain why the delusional belief is maintained and why capgras patients fail to 
take account of their background beliefs and of the testimony of others. General 
knowledge tells us that impostor stories are unlikely in most instances. Why would 
someone want to impersonate one’s relatives? Family members, friends, and doc-
tors insist that this person is the patient’s wife and not an impostor. Why do capgras 
patients not listen to them?
a number of proposals have been made to explain why the belief, once formed, 
is maintained tenaciously in spite of contrary evidence. some of these proposals 
postulate biases of various kinds, such as biases in probabilistic reasoning—a ten-
dency to jump to conclusions—and attributional biases—a tendency to explain the 
subject’s experience in terms of external rather than internal causes—(Kaney & 
bentall, 1989) or, alternatively, an observational bias (stone & Young, 1997). Others 
suggest a failure of inhibition of prepotent doxastic response (i.e., an impairment in 
reality testing [Davies et al., 2001] or an impairment in global consistency-checking 
procedures [hirstein & ramachandran, 1997]).
the problem with these explanations is that they make unwanted predictions. 
they imply that capgras patients would develop delusional beliefs whenever they 
have any kind of unusual experiences, such as visual illusions. but the capgras 
delusion, like other monothematic delusions, tends to be relatively circumscribed. 
in domains other than that of their delusions, the reasoning skills and cognitive 
behavior of capgras patients appear, by and large, to be normal. What needs 
explaining is therefore not only why subjects fail to check their delusional belief 
appropriately, but also why the failure is localized.
there are three kinds of checking procedures one may use to decide whether 
or not an observational belief should be accepted. One can check the belief (1) by 
enlarging one’s set of observations, (2) by using background knowledge and general 
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encyclopedic knowledge, and (3) by relying on the testimony of others. Why is the 
delusional belief not refuted using these procedures?
Further Observations
in the capgras delusion, the delusional belief is grounded in the unusual experi-
ences the subject has when looking at his or her relatives. Further observation 
would mean to keep looking to see if the feeling of familiarity is restored. the 
problem, though, is that if the affective route to face recognition is damaged, the 
checking procedure will keep giving the same negative result. as bermúdez (2001) 
and hohwy and rosenberg (2005) point out, the recurrence of the experience will 
result in a reinforcement of the belief rather than its rejection. to this it may be 
objected that, if the damage is to a visual pathway, using another modality would 
restore the feeling of familiarity. indeed, the patient Ds studied by hirstein and 
ramachandran (1997), who regarded his father as an impostor when in his pres-
ence, never treated him as such when talking to him on the phone. the prob-
lem is that in humans the visual modality tends to dominate over other sensory 
modalities. thus, when talking to his father face to face, the conflict between the 
visual and the auditory modality would typically be resolved in favor of the visual 
modality. as hohwy and rosenberg argue, when the experience occurs in sensory 
modalities or at processing stages that keep giving the same results and when fur-
ther intermodal testing cannot be performed (or, if performed, cannot outweigh 
the results of the dominant modality), it will be taken as veridical. if the experience 
is generated in a modular way and the module is damaged, this first checking pro-
cedure is useless or, rather, instead of helping falsify the experience-based belief, it 
will bring only further confirmation of it.
Background Knowledge
here we should distinguish between two kinds of background knowledge. First, 
there is biographical knowledge concerning the relative supposedly replaced by 
an impostor—for the patient’s wife, say, the date they were married, the place 
where they spent their honeymoon and various other episodes of their common 
life. second, there also is general knowledge about the world, such as the fact that 
impostor stories are implausible in the first place. if we consider the first type of 
background knowledge, a confrontation with the purported impostor may not yield 
incontrovertible evidence that the subject’s belief is wrong. the purported impos-
tor knows when he was married, knows that he spent his honeymoon in hawaii, 
that he and she have regular fights over the education of the children, and so on. 
but is it proof that she is who she says she is or, rather, is it proof that she is a clever 
impostor? an impostor is not just someone who happens to look like the subject’s 
wife (a “sosie”), but rather someone who pretends to be his wife and wants to make 
him believe that she is his wife. in addition, if this discussion takes place face 
to face, the capgras patient will experience a disturbing feeling of unfamiliarity, 
together perhaps with the impression that she is ill-intentioned while talking to the 
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person and this may suffice to bias his evaluation of the biographical evidence that 
is being laid out for him.
if we consider general background knowledge, capgras patients may be able to 
appreciate the implausibility of impostor stories, but this consideration alone may 
not carry enough weight. implausible is not synonymous with impossible. consider 
the following well-known exchange:10
E: isn’t that [two families] unusual?
s: it was unbelievable.
E: how do you account for it?
s: i don’t know. i have tried to understand it myself and it was virtually impossible.
s: What if i told you i don’t believe it?
E: that’s perfectly understandable. in fact, when i tell the story, i feel that i’m 
concocting a story…it’s not quite right, something is wrong.
E: if someone told you the story what would you think?
s: i would find it extremely hard to believe. i should be defending myself. 
(alexander, stuss, & benson, 1979, p. 335)
thus, checking procedures that appeal to background knowledge would not 
yield unequivocal results. Use of biographical knowledge could be taken as confir-
mation that the person who looks like one’s wife is trying to pass for her and hence 
is an impostor. Use of general knowledge could be taken as a confirmation that the 
situation the subject confronts is indeed weird and in need of explanation, rather 
than as an indication that the situation is not what the subject thinks it is.
The Testimony of Others
the testimony of others is part of the social division of epistemic labor. in the same 
way that, for language, we rely on “expert” speakers to know the exact meaning of 
certain words, for beliefs we rely on experts to tell us whether we should accept 
a belief or reject it. but, of course, who counts as an expert depends on what the 
belief is about. the experts whom one would rely on to check one’s beliefs about 
mathematics need not be those one would consult about gardening or politics. 
Perfect strangers are not qualified to tell a subject who his wife is. Presumably, he 
is one of the top experts in this field. Of course, other relatives and friends may 
qualify as experts too, so why not listen to them? One problem, though, is that 
the capgras delusion typically is initially about one close relative, but, as time 
passes, tends to spread to other relatives. the subject starts by thinking that his 
wife has been replaced by an impostor and ends up thinking that his whole fam-
ily has been replaced. thus, it may well be that those who would be the natural 
experts to turn to are actually people about whom the subject already harbors 
nagging suspicions.
Even if they have no doubt about the identity of their other relatives, capgras 
patients may, as hirstein suggests, be impaired at reading their expressions of emo-
tion and misinterpret their expressions of concern, sadness, etc. for negative inten-
tions (e.g., they are out to get me, it is a plot, they are trying to drive me crazy). in 
either scenario, the testimony of these potential experts would be discredited, and 
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the subject would have to rely on his sole expertise—an expertise that tells him the 
person in front of him is not his wife.
in a nutshell then, the main lines of the story i told here are as follows. the fail-
ure of a modular affective process involved in the recognition of emotional expres-
sion, the identification of dynamic signatures, and the generation of autonomic 
responses and feelings of familiarity to known faces accounts for the delusional 
experiences of capgras patients. their delusional beliefs inherit their content from 
their delusional experience. the particular nature of the beliefs determines what 
the appropriate checking procedures are. the reason why the capgras patients 
fail to dismiss their delusional beliefs is not that they fail to use these checking 
procedures. rather, it happens that these procedures fail to yield disconfirming 
evidence. For them to give solid grounds to reject the belief, the damaged module 
would have to be intact. the capgras patient is not epistemically incompetent; 
rather, in a way, he is the victim of a vicious epistemic circle. Fortunately though, 
this vicious circle is limited to beliefs with a specific type of content and etiology—
hence the circumscribed nature of the delusion.
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notes
 1. in this chapter, i will use the words “emotions” and “feelings” interchangeably.
 2. the material in this section draws heavily on Pacherie, Green, and bayne 
(submitted).
 3. it should be noted that it is possible that a comprehensive account of delusions will 
contain both endorsement and explanationist elements. Perhaps some delusions 
should be accounted for in endorsement terms and others in explanationist terms. it is 
also possible that in some instances patients adopt delusional beliefs in an attempt to 
explain their unusual experience, but that, as a result of having adopted the delusional 
belief, their experiences come to inherit the content of the delusion itself (Fleminger, 
1992).
 4. Or would they? it might be argued that by the very nature of the aberrant experience, 
even a “healthy” individual may not have the capacity to override the prepotent dox-
astic response. see hohwy and rosenberg (2005).
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 5. Davies and coltheart (2000) also make this point. Note, though, that prosopagnosia 
is not quite the mirror image of capgras syndrome because although prosopagnosics 
retain an autonomic response to familiar faces, they have lost the conscious (overt) 
feeling of familiarity towards them.
 6. instead of the typical capgras delusion—the false belief that someone has been 
replaced by an almost identical impostor whose actual identity is unknown to the 
patient—patient MF misidentified his wife as a former business partner. this is the 
main reason why breen et al. (2002) report his delusion as resembling a capgras delu-
sion rather than as a capgras delusion in the strict sense. the particulars of the case 
are important. MF’s former business partner, JY, bore a certain physical resemblance 
to his wife and the two women had similar names. but whereas MF had a very close 
positive emotional attachment to his wife, he intensely disliked JY on a personal level. 
breen et al. speculate that these factors, together with MF’s difficulty in discriminat-
ing some facial expressions and in recognizing face identity when the face showed an 
expression, were likely contributing to his misidentification of his wife as his former 
business partner. in hirstein’s terms, MF’s face-processing impairments would have 
led him to form an incorrect “internal representation” of his wife when seeing her—a 
representation that happened to match his stored internal representation of his former 
business. the fact that this internal representation yielded by faulty face processing 
would match a stored internal representation of JY, together with the fact that the 
two women had similar names and physical appearances, would then account for the 
unusual features of the case.
 7. Unfortunately, most studies investigating autonomic responses and feelings of famili-
arity to faces lump faces of celebrities and faces of people personally known to the 
subjects, such as relatives and friends, together in the category of familiar faces. Yet 
it may well be that automatic responses and feelings of familiarity are not generated 
in exactly the same way for these two types of faces. in particular, identification of the 
dynamic signature of a face might play a more important role for people we interact 
with on a regular basis.
 8. thanks to renée bilodeau for pointing out this objection.
 9. Note, though, that having shallow output is probably one of the less central features of 
modularity and that Fodor himself seems to have a rather generous notion of shallow 
output in mind. For instance, in his discussion of this feature, Fodor (1983) consid-
ers that the output of the peripheral visual system does not only encode information 
about color and shape but also provides basic-level categorizations, à la rosch, of the 
objects seen.
 10. the patient who takes part in the exchange is presented by alexander et al. (1979) as 
suffering from capgras syndrome. however, the case presents some unusual features. 
in particular, the patient claimed that he had two families of identical composition 
and described positive feelings toward “both wives.” this suggests that his delusion 
may perhaps be better classified as a form of reduplicative paramnesia. how best to 
taxonomize the various misidentification syndromes is, however, a vexing issue on 
which there is at present no consensus.
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